Corporeal Congregations and Asynchronous Lives: Unpacking the Pews at Spring Street

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ABSTRACT This article seeks to expose the “fallacies of synchrony” that often accompany the analysis of human remains. In approaching a cemetery, for example, we all too easily think of the bodies there as a “community,” even when they belong to different generations or geographic contexts. This simple point has major implications, especially for the bioarchaeology of urban landscapes. Here, chronologically disparate elements accumulate in vast mélange, offering innumerable examples of the “non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous,” an idea developed by Karl Mannheim ([1928] 1952) and Alfred Schutz (1967), and now extended to archaeology by Gavin Lucas (2015).

To escape the fallacies of synchrony and explore the shifting rhythms of city life, I turn to the case of the Spring Street Presbyterian Church in Manhattan. When the church burial vaults (ca. 1820–1850) were unexpectedly unearthed in 2006, they seemed to represent a ready-made “congregation.” Yet Spring Street was actually a “catchment zone” of mingled and mangled temporalities. Though placed together in death, the bodies there had only occasionally crossed paths in life. By following some of their traces to and from the site, we may come to understand what it means to gather, work, and worship together in a society of strangers. [cemetery, generation, life course, temporality, Manhattan]

RESUMEN Este artículo busca exponer las “falacias de la sincronía” que a menudo acompañan el análisis de los restos humanos. Cuando nos acercamos a un cementerio, por ejemplo, todos fácilmente pensamos de los cuerpos allí como una “comunidad,” aunque pertenezcan a diferentes generaciones o contextos geográficos. Este simple punto tiene mayores implicaciones, especialmente para la bioarqueología de los paisajes urbanos. Aquí, elementos cronológicamente dispares se acumulan en vastas mezclas, ofreciendo innumerables ejemplos de la “no-contemporaneidad de lo contemporáneo”, una idea desarrollada por Karl Mannheim ([1928] 1952) y Alfred Schutz (1967), y ahora extendida a la arqueología por Gavin Lucas (2015). Para escapar de las falacias de la sincronía y explorar los ritmos cambiantes de la vida de la ciudad, vuelvo al caso de la Iglesia Presbiteriana de Spring Street en Manhattan. Cuando las bóvedas de entierro de la iglesia (ca. 1820–1850) fueron desenterradas inesperadamente en 2006, parecieron representar una “congregación” previamente formada. Todavía Spring Street era en realidad una “zona de captación” de temporalidades mezcladas y mutiladas. Aunque colocados juntos en muerte, los cuerpos allí sólo ocasionalmente habían cruzado caminos en vida. Siguiendo algunas de sus huellas desde y hacia el sitio, podemos llegar a entender qué significa reunir, trabajar, y rezar juntos en una sociedad de extraños. [cementerio, generación, curso de vida, temporalidad, barrio de Manhattan]
view these people as bound together, not just in this spot but in a time and place that has passed. Approaching a cemetery, for example, we all too easily think of the bodies there as a community—a set of individuals who may have known and interacted with one another. It takes a certain mental discipline to disentangle these people, realizing that they were perhaps not acquainted at all, that their lives might have been led over quite different generations or geographies. This article is an exercise in such discipline, an attempt to overcome the temptations of conflation—the often unconscious collapsing of diverse histories and biographies that congregate in cemeteries, archaeological sites, laboratories, and databases.

Because my argument emerges from a study of human skeletal remains, it would usually be classified under the rubric of “bioarchaeology.” Indeed, this is the field in which I was trained and from which I still derive my professional identity. Yet bioarchaeology is hardly a unified discipline; it remains divided along the lines suggested by its hybrid name. Thus, Gordon Rakita (2014) identified two “tribes” among bioarchaeologists in the United States, one geared to issues of “biological adaptation,” the other to “a wide range of anthropologically relevant questions” (see also Agarwal and Glencross 2011; Buikstra et al. 2011). My own approach is rooted in the latter tribe, with its characteristic focus on “cultural and social identity rather than simply health status” and its tendency to draw on “theories from socio-cultural anthropology” as well as “post-processual developments in archaeology” (Rakita 2014, 223). In some ways, however, the present argument is perhaps too “undisciplined” to satisfy either tribe. It engages directly with social and cultural theory outside anthropology—in particular, the work of the sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947)—as well as a spate of recent scholarship concerned with multiple temporalities or “kinds of time” (Dawdy 2010; Fowler 2013; Lucas 2005; Olivier 2011; Robb 2002). In hopes of furthering the “temporal turn” (Bear 2016), my aim here is to expose and destabilize certain tacit assumptions about “cohorts,” “generations,” and other demographic bundles that have long served to guide the practice of bioarchaeology and of anthropology in general.

In this light, what follows has a special affinity with the work of Rachel Watkins and Jennifer Muller (2015), whose study of the W. Montague Cobb skeletal collection led them to question a number of their own methodological assumptions and practices. In particular, Watkins and Muller came to doubt their “adherence to normative ways of categorizing research samples,” including “the use of singular categories around which data are organized such as: date of birth, date of death, geographical location, age cohort, and ethnicity” (42). Such “uniform organizational schemes,” while facilitating comparative statistical analysis, tended to hamper their efforts “to rigorously examine the complexity of the biological and social context of the collection,” and in the end obscured “the spectra of human experiences represented in population samples” (49). This kind of critical reflexivity, I argue, is vital to our enterprise, inasmuch as conventional categories that would otherwise go unexamined are made explicit and thus available for refinement or replacement. Moreover, by upgrading our epistemological equipment, the approach taken by Watkins and Muller promises to renew our most basic anthropological appreciation for the multiplicities of being(s) in the world.

A “SIMPLE” SITE

In this spirit of reflexivity and renewal, I draw here on my own analysis of the burial vaults at the Spring Street Presbyterian Church in Manhattan. In December 2006, during construction of Trump SoHo, a luxury condominium and hotel complex, skeletal remains were inadvertently exhumed (Morin 2010). In summer 2007, when I became involved in the skeletal analysis, the case seemed fairly straightforward. The remains had been found in four contiguous vaults within a small, delimited area (Mooney 2010). Moreover, based on the evidence from coffin plates and city records, the vaults had been active within a brief timeframe, from about 1820 until 1850 (Novak 2017a). Spring Street seemed to be an ideal “short-term use cemetery” of the kind described by Sharon DeWitte and Christopher Stojanowski (2015). The advantage of such a site is the relatively close match between the people buried there and the living population from which they came. The remains there, in other words, are likely to “more closely represent cohorts, generations, or populations and not time-averaged lineages” (DeWitte and Stojanowski 2015, 414). In this light, it was easy to assume that the vaults at Spring Street might provide a “snapshot” of a local population in a particular place and time.

Indeed, such a “simple site,” with its short-term use and strong chronology, is exactly what has been prescribed to minimize the problem of mismatch between the demographic and health characteristics of a sample and those of its associated population (DeWitte and Stojanowski 2015; Jackes 2011; Wood et al. 1992). While I am not concerned here with the “osteological paradox,” this issue is indirectly related to my argument.1 In particular, I agree with James Wood et al. that “the relationship between aggregate measures and the experience of the individuals making up the aggregate can be remarkably tenuous” (1992, 345)—especially when such measures collapse the experiences of people in different generations or when their social and material environment is undergoing rapid change.

Bioarchaeologists would clearly benefit from a focus on “simple” sites containing skeletal samples of short duration. Based on their survey of the literature, however, DeWitte and Stojanowski concluded that “there has not been a shift toward short-term use cemeteries”—indeed, “the average site duration used was 552 years . . . with a range from 1 to 7,000 years” (2015, 414). By comparison, the Spring Street site, with a duration of just thirty years, would seem to be ideally “simple.” Yet even a site of this kind is liable to be construed, if only unconsciously, as a coherent and representative image of a past population.
Consider, for example, one characterization of the people buried at Spring Street: “Their skeletons provide a glimpse into the biological history of antebellum New York. As the only group of human remains from this period available for study, the demographic and paleopathological data that they generate allow for a more accurate reconstruction of the nature of life and death during this turbulent period in the city’s history” (Crist 2010, 91). This implies that the bodies from Spring Street represent the “antebellum” period, separate and distinct from an earlier colonial era or a later postbellum context. Additionally, the remains are assumed to be residents of “New York,” an insular city with clearly delimited boundaries.

Such simplifying assumptions are often convenient starting points for an investigation, and similar ones guided the initial research in my own lab. Research was designed and grants were written with similar optimism about the narrowly circumscribed social and historical context. It seemed, in the beginning, that these bodies might actually “hold still.” Only when I turned to a consideration of the experiences of these individuals across their many life courses—and within rapidly shifting social, spatial, and material domains—did such assumptions begin to seem deeply problematic. Through an insidious slippage, the bodies at Spring Street had come to stand in for the New Yorkers of the early nineteenth century and particularly for the residents of a specific neighborhood with its Presbyterian congregation.

Such an attitude, I would argue, is likely to creep into the thinking of most observers trying to understand human remains that are clustered in physical space. This is not to say that (bio)archaeologists or other researchers explicitly conceive of any given set of remains as a collectivity or community, but in practice they often treat it as such. As a result, the dead are effectively trapped in an artificial place and time that has more to do with convenient (and normative) categories of analysis than with the social and historical contexts in which they actually lived.

RHYTHMS AND RUTS
In studies of human remains, there are at least two distinct forms of conflation. Both are based on what Alfred North Whitehead (1919) called the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” the tendency to mistake the abstract for the actual. The first involves typological thinking—the collapse of empirical variation into abstract categories for analytical purposes. Especially problematic is the tendency to treat individuals who died at the same estimated age as if they belong to the same birth cohort. Because these individuals may have been born at quite different times, they did not necessarily move simultaneously through age-appropriate life experiences. Yet one essential procedure of skeletal analysis is to calculate for each individual an age at death based on standard measures of growth and decay, then classify that individual together with others who died at the same estimated age. While this process draws on standards calibrated from past data (often including specimens from extremely distant times and places), it also involves looking forward, in the sense that standards tend to shape our expectations and guide our research paths (Walford 2015). Such models and techniques for “making time” are thus oriented to the future as well as the past.

The second kind of conflation, and the one with which I am especially concerned, is subtler. It springs not from the imposition of an artificial typology on the data, but from the seductive “density” of the evidence as encountered—specifically, the sense that a gathering of bodies implies sociological propinquity. If a cemetery may be conceived as a neighborhood or village, even a museum collection of human remains is easily construed as a community-like aggregate. To some extent, this mirrors the assumptions of traditional ethnographic research, in which spatial tropes such as the “fieldsite” have tended to create a sense of bounded and unified culture (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). More recently, there have been efforts to “temporalize the field,” to conceptualize the site of ethnographic research as “sometime” as well as “somewhere,” a setting populated with multiple generations of both the living and the dead (Dalsgaard and Nielsen 2015). A similar temporalization of cemeteries and other sets of human remains might guide us away from the fallacy of sociological propinquity.

Without this revision, we are left with a strangely oversynchronized image, reminiscent of one conjured up by Darwin in his discussion of the “mutual affinities of organic beings” (1859, 432). What if “every form which has ever lived on this earth,” he wondered, “were suddenly to reappear”? Take the case of human evolution. If every hominin that has ever lived were to reappear, we would have something like the “family portrait” in Figure 1. This is not the way the world works, of course, because of the extinction of species. Extinction, Darwin argued, tends to separate groups of related organisms, “defining and widening the intervals between the several groups of each class.” On a smaller timescale, the same might be said of death—both the demise of individuals and the slower passing of entire “generations.” Even one death introduces an interval, and many deaths, whether at once or over several decades, introduce major gaps that must be incorporated into our analysis.

Alternatives to conflation are, to some extent, already available. The typological treatment of age cohorts, for example, has been addressed by life-course approaches that allow persons to emerge through embodied acts and interactions within shifting landscapes and social domains (e.g., Agarwal 2016; Gilchrist 2012; Gowland 2015; Robb 2002; Søfaer 2006, 2011; Watkins and Muller 2015). Yet there remains the challenge of positioning multiple “courses”—not just life courses but also courses of action and maneuver—in relation to one another, especially when people and things move in asynchronous ways. Many modern settings are vast mazes of chronologically disparate elements, with radically different historical origins, trajectories, “fellow travelers,” and destinations (e.g., Geller and Suri 2014; Novak 2014, 2017b). Such settings offer innumerable examples of the “non-contemporaneity
of the contemporaneous,” a key concept to be taken up below.

Urbanizing landscapes are particularly challenging in this light, as a result of their often frenetic tempos and rhythms of change. “Cities,” as Shannon Lee Dawdy puts it, “are characterized by sudden breaks and disjunctions, discordant time zones, and rough, stubborn continuities” (2016a, 33; see also Dawdy 2016b). Other authors have likewise explored cityscapes as palimpsests of heterogeneous time-space relations (Allen 2008; Elias 1992; Matthews 2011; Munn 2013a, 2013b). For example, in his famous essay, “Walking in the City,” Michel de Certeau argued that New York “has never learned the art of growing old by playing on all its pasts. Its present invents itself, from hour to hour, in the act of throwing away its previous accomplishments and challenging the future” (1984, 91). Such “throwing away” is sometimes pointed out by city-dwellers themselves. Thus, on her own “walk” through antebellum New York, Nancy Munn emphasized how acutely aware residents were of the city’s transformation: “People were not just constantly noticing change, but they often remarked on the rapidity with which their familiar place-world was disappearing” (2013a, 360). Indeed, New Yorkers could feel the differences accumulating in and around them, though often in quite dissimilar ways.

To escape the fallacies of synchrony and explore the temporal rhythms and ruts of city life, let us return to the case of Spring Street. The church burial vaults, dating from the first half of the nineteenth century, were unexpectedly unearthed in 2006 and thus suddenly surfaced as a ready-made “congregation.” This skeletal collection, furthermore, seemed to offer an interesting comparison with the only other large sample recovered from the city: the African Burial Ground (ABG) in Lower Manhattan. At the same time, the two cases seemed sharply disconnected, as the ABG was a colonial-era slave cemetery (ca. 1690 to 1794), while the Spring Street vaults received free members of a Presbyterian congregation in the antebellum era. Given the social and temporal distance between the two sites, there seemed little reason to engage with the earlier case. Only much later would I realize that some of those interred at the African Burial Ground may have shared physical space, historical moments, and possibly even personal experiences with some who would later be buried at Spring Street.

In short, when the Spring Street vaults are unpacked, we begin to see that this “gathering” is actually a catchment zone of mingled and mangled temporalities. The lives of some church members were quite brief and socially limited, while others had long, multifaceted biographies. Despite being placed together in death, they only occasionally crossed paths in life. At the same time, they undoubtedly interacted with many others who would not ordinarily be considered part of their world. By following some of the traces to and from the burial site, we are led to distant gatherings and events, with some serendipitous encounters along the way.

CONSTRUCTION ZONES

At the turn of the nineteenth century, New York City had some 60,000 residents. By mid-century, this number would multiply tenfold to 600,000, about half of whom were foreign born (Gorn 1987, 393). These demographic shifts were fueled by the so-called Market Revolution, the rapid consolidation of an international, profit-driven economy that relied on cheap and unskilled labor (Sellars 1991; Stokes and Conway 1996). With the abolition of slavery in New York State in 1827, and as manufacturing and maritime trade increased, immigrants and rural migrants flooded into the
city in search of work, resulting in an increasingly diverse populace.

The emerging commercial economy altered not only the physical environment of New York City but the social ecology as well—the ways people worked, raised families, formed communities, and engaged with public institutions. An “embryonic middle class” that included “shopkeepers, small master craftsmen, clerks, salesmen, bookkeepers, and bank tellers” would come to embrace “evangelicalism as a way to dissociate themselves from both the dissolute poor and the idle rich” (Burrows and Wallace 1999, 530). These middling families were often clustered in areas on the periphery of the city, including the 8th Ward, where the Spring Street Church was located (Figure 2).

The Spring Street congregation was led by activist pastors who propagated an ideology of free will, self-improvement, and social justice, including an aggressive abolitionist stance. While abolitionists are often characterized as bourgeois reformers, historian Manisha Sinha (2016) has emphasized that they were not typical social climbers. Rather, these were diverse people brought together by a radical critique of unfree labor at home or abroad. Moreover, their democratic movement involved many who lacked formal education or came from the working poor. When the Reverend Henry Ludlow, for example, assumed leadership of the Spring Street congregation in 1828, he wrote that most of its members “belong to that class of person who cannot afford to purchase or hire a pew in our city churches.”

From the beginning, Sinha argued, the abolitionist movement was “interracial” and involved many young men and women who would go on to marry and raise children within the activist ranks (2016, 5, 254). Such diversity and inclusiveness are certainly apparent at Spring Street, where a number of free individuals of African descent received full communion, while their children participated in the church’s multiracial Sunday school (Meade 2010).

A dedicated place to gather had been established in 1810 when the cornerstone for the church was laid in what was then bucolic hinterland. During a yellow fever outbreak in the summer of 1822, the populace of Lower Manhattan fled north, initiating an expansion of the city that would continue over the next decade. The shingled, wood-frame church was soon embedded in an urban landscape. The structure underwent many additions and renovations, especially after being vandalized during the 1834 anti-abolitionist riots (Gilje 1987). Meanwhile, between 1820 and 1850, the mortal remains of hundreds of worshipers were interred in four subterranean vaults built of limestone and brick (Meade 2010). These were located in a yard immediately adjacent to the church. In 1823 an extension was built over two of the chambers for a “lecture hall,” which also served as a classroom for the Sunday school (Hutchings 1894, 9).

The church remained a fixture on Spring Street until it burned down in 1966. As the decades passed and descendants dispersed, the vaults were paved over and forgotten, only to be rediscovered in 2006 during the construction of Trump SoHo (Mooney 2010). Within the vaults were thousands of commingled skeletal remains from at least 197 individuals, ranging from several fetuses to an eighty-seven-year-old man (Figure 3).

How might we make sense of such people without relegating them to statistical anonymity, on the one hand, or
creating caricatures of the zeitgeist, on the other? First, they must be allowed to move beyond the confines of the church. As Tim Ingold has emphasized, “lives are not led inside places but through, around, to and from them, from and to places elsewhere” (2000, 229). At Spring Street, stable isotope analysis has identified an adolescent who was a recent immigrant; he was likely one of the many thousands of European travelers in the 1830s who came to the city looking for work (Novak 2017a). A coffin plate allows us to follow another person on the move: Nicholas Ware, a US senator from Georgia. Though Ware seems to have had little to do with the church over his lifetime,8 he died suddenly on a visit to New York and his burial was paid for by a benevolent member of the congregation (White and Mooney 2010, 48). While the bodies of the senator and the immigrant shared space in the church vaults, they had little in common and are unlikely to have crossed paths. Indeed, Ware was likely deceased even before the immigrant set foot in the United States.

With these differences in mind, if we look closely at the demographic profile of the skeletal population (Table 1), we have to wonder how many other mutual affinities have been created by categorizing people. As in Darwin’s thought experiment, have we simply bundled together beings who lived in quite different times and places? If they were a congregation, sitting together in the pews, would they even know the people around them? Senator Ware and the immigrant would not have, though the young man might have heard of the gentleman from Georgia. Others might scan the pews, searching for a glimmer of recognition. These points should give us pause, as they raise an issue that is surprisingly difficult to grasp, both conceptually and analytically: the problem of generations.

**GENERATION GAPS**

The idea of generation is a commonplace of American culture. The baby boomers, generation X, the millennials, and whatever the next one will be called—these groupings are seen as having a commonality based on their year of birth and significant historical events of their early lives. At the same time, good scholarly treatments of generational phenomena have been remarkably rare—especially compared with the vast literature on other dimensions of social identity, including class, race, ethnicity, and gender (Burnett 2010; Pilcher 1994). A classic anthropological account of the “generation gap” was offered by Margaret Mead (1970) in *Culture and Commitment*. Appropriately, the topic of generational transitions was taken up and further explored by her daughter, Mary Catherine Bateson (2000). Meanwhile, in his pioneering ethnography of the Ilongot of northern Luzon, Renato Rosaldo (1980) made innovative use of “cohort analysis,” including the work of Karl Mannheim to be considered below. More recent studies in cultural anthropology have focused on generations in relation to social class (Ortner 1998, 2003), gender and modernity (Rofel 1999), globalization (Cole and Durham 2006), postcolonialism (Allen and Jobson 2016; Scott 2014), and collective memory (Palmberger 2016).

Here I revisit one canonical attempt to theorize the concept: Mannheim’s essay, “The Problem of Generations” ([1928] 1952). In his broader study of the sociology of knowledge, Mannheim became interested in how being born in a particular time and place, within a specific historical context, had the potential to influence experiences over the life course. Central to his formulation is the intersection of biological processes of aging with the tempo of social and cultural change. Mannheim’s rich essay sheds light on biological and social relations, the nature of time, biography...
and history, and mechanisms of social change. While these points cannot be elaborated here, I want to draw attention to two concepts central to his argument. First is the idea of "fresh contact," the notion that interactions in one’s formative years may be shared by a wider age group because their crucial early experiences put them in contact with the same events. The second is the “non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous,” a concept Mannheim borrows from the art historian Wilhelm Pinder (1926). In Mannheim’s usage, such non-contemporaneity refers to the fact that, at any given time, older and younger age groups in a society may experience the same events differently, depending on whether the events have been confronted “point blank” or against an established background. The observation that all people living at the same time do not necessarily share the same history has important implications for past bodies, along with the worlds they shaped and were shaped by.

From Mannheim’s perspective, “generations” are neither biological units formed by natural sequences nor social groupings that transcend biological processes. Rather, they are relational collectives that emerge within wider ecologies of shifting social and material interactions. “If we speak simply of ‘generations’ without any further differentiation we arrive at a sort of sociology of chronological tables (Geschichtstabellensoziologie), which uses a bird’s-eye-view perspective to ‘discover’ fictitious generation movements to correspond to the crucial turning-points in historical chronology” ([1928] 1952, 311). Rather than the ticking of a biological clock, with the “hours” measured in twenty-five-year or thirty-year increments, the generational process, according to Mannheim, involves “potentialities which may materialize, or be suppressed, or become embedded in other social forces and manifest themselves in modified form” (303). Vital to this process is the pace of social and material transformation: “As the tempo of change becomes faster, smaller and smaller modifications are experienced by young people as significant ones” (302). Central to this argument, then, is the recognition of one’s place in relation to others (including other things) as they too grow, persist, or drift away.

The complexities of temporal relations, including both synchronism and anachronism, in the archaeological record have been recently explored by Gavin Lucas (2015). In particular, he finds the concept of contemporaneity to be problematic, inasmuch as objects are defined as contemporaneous in relation to a unit of time (2). Lucas proposes an alternative approach that draws on Alfred Schutz’s (1967) concept of “consociation.” Schutz (1899–1959), a younger contemporary of Mannheim, developed a social phenomenology that highlights close contact—the sharing of physical space as well as time. Consociates, accordingly, are persons who actually encounter one another, mingling and perhaps cooperating in the course of daily life. Unlike mere contemporaries, then, consociates “are ‘involved in one another’s biography,’ at least minimally; they ‘grow older together,’ at least momentarily” (Geertz 1973, 365).

Indeed, the concept of consociation is most salient when we attend to our entanglements in a wider social world. In this light, Lucas modifies the original concept in a radical way: he extends it to include both humans and nonhumans. “People can be consociated with things,” he writes, “and even things can be consociated with things” (2015, 12). This revision, Lucas argues, “allows us to inquire about the temporality of things in relation to one another, not time per se” (11; see also Fowler 2013). A more symmetrical approach to the world, with its diverse beings and entities, presents us with an especially lively landscape. With multiplicities of biographies on the move, generations and genealogies multiply, carrying with them histories of past relations and potentials for future encounters.

While such an approach introduces an array of generative possibilities, it also opens up numerous fissures and rifts—wedges driven between people, their movements, and prospects. Life “courses,” therefore, are hardly linear trajectories that can be understood simply in terms of biological or historical time. As Deborah A. Thomas argues, “the distance between past, present, and future is not essentially linear but ‘co-related,’ with ‘co-relation’ here evoking temporal entanglements without demarcating the causal chains through which they occur” (2016, 194). By attending to the losses and ruptures inherent in various comings and goings, we can reintroduce the gaps that Darwin emphasized in his discussion of extinction, or what Laurent Olivier describes as “the blank space that gives meaning” (2011, 174).

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TABLE 1. Minimum Number of Individuals (MNI) and Demographic Distribution Based on Left Femur
UNPACKING THE PEWS

With these points in mind, we may begin to unpack the Spring Street pews. Typically, we would approach our skeletal population as a series of age categories, each telling us something about growing up and heading out into the world at different stages, before moving on to the next (Table 1). Here, however, I turn this around and consider date of birth and the wider sociohistorical conditions during formative years of “fresh contact.”

We are fortunate to have a number of legible coffin plates that help us disaggregate these age categories, which appear to have forced some individuals into shared relationships that may be dubious or misleading. In Figure 4, I have plotted the birth and death dates of thirty-three persons from their coffin plates. What becomes obvious from this exercise is that the burial vaults, active for about thirty years—approximately one generation—contain some people who lived and died over the span of a century. Moreover, when the age categories into which they were compressed are expanded, some people articulate with others at different times and stages of their lives, while others become distant memories, and still others futures imagined.

If we layer in some key events, Spring Street becomes a case study in both Mannheim’s generation problem and Schutz’s consociation. Those congregants who matured in the mid-eighteenth century witnessed the birth of the republic and the contentious process of institution building that those born after the turn of the century would only encounter as “history.” At the same time, other notable changes would mark their formative years. The War of 1812, an end to slavery in New York State, and the 1834 race riots all made people aware of their positions, and their relations to others, within particular places and times.

We have already considered some of the discrepancies between the life histories of two individuals interred at Spring Street, Senator Nicholas Ware and the anonymous immigrant. Another pair, Rudolphus Bogert (1766–1842) and Louisa Hunter (1809–1825), allow us to expand on such matters. Unlike the senator and the immigrant, Bogert and Hunter are very likely to have attended the church on the same Sundays and may even have sat in the same pew. Because of the age and sex differences between them, however, these contemporaries would typically fall into discrete categories of analysis. Based on their ages at death, Bogert would be classified as an “older adult male,” while Hunter would be grouped with “adolescents” of either sex (given the difficulty of determining sex in immature skeletal remains). By comparing these seemingly distinct individuals, however, we are in a position to appreciate how they may have experienced the same physical place or historical event, but in radically different ways. Indeed, as Nancy Munn argues, this kind of case raises an “old question about sameness and
are also grown” (2014, 3). In this light, Hunter’s failure to thrive would have made her body a special project that likely involved physicians and bleedings, medicines and dietary restrictions, and ultimately a coffin with her nameplate attached.

By the time Hunter died in 1825, Rudolphus Bogert was a successful, fifty-nine-year-old businessman. Yet his body, at this point, must have shown the wear and tear of years of hard physical labor. In his twenties he had served as a captain in the New York State Militia (Hastings 1901, 367). While working as a commission merchant, he would also volunteer for the New York City Fire Company #36 (New York Common Council 1917, 299). Fused vertebræ, arthritic joints, pulled muscles, and broken kneecaps (Figure 8) were just some of the conditions that would worsen over subsequent decades before he died from an ulcerated bladder (NYC Death Records). For Bogert, maturing in this city involved strenuous bodily mediations, stresses and strains from a material world that pushed back (Bear 2014, 20). Indeed, “making is tough on bodies as well as materials” (Ingold and Hallam 2014, 9). Some of these makings would be experienced as painful events, while others would simply creep up on him. In any case, these bodily remembrances would create future limitations, requiring adjustments and alternative paths of action.

Whether Bogert knew Louisa Hunter’s father, or Louisa herself, is unclear. When she died, however, he may well have joined the funeral procession, which departed from the New York Institution, wound its way past the now unacknowledged graves of eighteenth-century slaves, and arrived, almost one mile to the north, at the Spring Street Church (New York Daily Advertiser 1825).

By now we are in a position to appreciate the different generational worlds that existed within the same physical space occupied by these two bodies. Consider the different ways in which Bogert and Hunter would have related to the Spring Street Church itself. To Bogert, it was a relatively new institution, founded in 1810 when he was forty-four years old. Hunter, on the other hand, was just an infant when the church was established and would never have known a time when it did not exist. For Bogert, being a member of the church would have been a matter of choice—perhaps a deliberate decision to congregate with people from different ethnic, racial, and class backgrounds, and to associate with a radical abolitionist stance. Hunter, by contrast, was born into the congregation, presumably as a result of a choice made by her parents.

The African Burial Ground was another place that would have been familiar to both Bogert and Hunter, yet with quite different textures and meanings for each of them. Enslaved Africans were part of the social landscape in which Bogert had grown up; his ancestors had likely owned slaves, and the process of emancipation in New York State had only begun in 1799, when he was thirty-three years old. Again, Hunter would have had a very different experience of both African Americans and the local land where so many of them had been buried in the eighteenth century. In fact, from the age
of twelve, Hunter had lived either right on or next to the former burial ground, which had been closed and slated for development before the turn of the century, well before she was born.

Finally, in a more general sense, we may ask: With whom should Bogert be associated in our minds—with the young woman whose body shares his burial vault, or with his seemingly distinct neighbors in the African Burial Ground? In a surprising way, Bogert may have shared a “common location” and set of historical experiences with many people whose bodies were buried on the margins of white society. Yet the idea that Bogert or any of the Spring Street congregants, nineteenth-century Presbyterians, should be associated with eighteenth-century slaves, is unlikely to occur to us—unless, that is, we take seriously the physical intersections of quite diverse life histories, even across generations and geographies.

At the same time, the approach taken by Lucas (2015), with its emphasis on the consociation of people and things, raises new ethical and political concerns (Crossland 2015).
Was it possible for people of such different social positions to share in important events of “fresh contact”? As they grew older together (at least for a while) and looked back upon their lives, would they have paused to think of one another? Moreover, would they have even recognized each other as consociates—or as the same kind of person or thing? Having moved with Bogert and Hunter through Manhattan’s shifting chronoscapes, we cannot help but wonder whose futures, or hopes for the future, were realized and at what cost to others. As the political and ethical dimensions of making and growing in a city become tangible, our illusion of synchronicity shatters into heterogeneous tempos and asynchronous lives.

TOGETHER AGAIN, APART

In the fall of 1841, the former mayor of New York, Phillip Hone, entered these lines in his diary (1889, 95):

It appears to me that I am more than a year older than I was last year on this day. How much faster we go down than up hill, and how much less time there is to stop and gather flowers by the way! There are not so many flowers, either, or perhaps we cannot see them, or want the taste to enjoy them. Stones and ruts and jolts there are enough, and sorely do our bones feel the effects of them; but on we go!

It was Hone’s sixty-first birthday. Over his lifetime, his city, like his body, had been transformed. Indeed, he had the sense that both his bones and the built environment were changing ever more rapidly, while they absorbed the “jolts” of forward movement.

Such jolts were very much on the minds of antebellum New Yorkers. Though change seemed to be constantly humming all around them, on occasion its effects could be startling, especially when material traces of the past inserted themselves unexpectedly into mundane routines. In the spring of 1845, Hone again turned to his diary to reflect on his changing world, this time when fragments of a Revolutionary War cannon were unearthed in his father’s cellar (1889, 246; see also Munn 2013b):

Overturn, overturn, overturn! is the maxim of New York. The very bones of our ancestors are not permitted to lie quiet a quarter of a century, and one generation of men seem studious to remove all relics of those which preceded them.

Hone’s palpable anxiety about dispossession—the loss of lineage, land, and historical memory with each passing generation—reflects the extraordinary upheavals that had beset antebellum America. Cities, in particular, had witnessed explosive population growth, accelerating flows of
people and commodities over ever-greater distances, and the often tense or violent confrontation of diverse ethnic and national groupings.

Modernity, as James Vernon (2014) has vividly shown, is the novel social condition of living in a society of strangers. While each people has entered modernity in their own unique way, “once a society of strangers had taken shape, it generated similar problems of remaking the forms of government, exchange, and association that were in turn addressed by culturally specific forms of abstraction and embedding” (132–33). Vernon’s notion of “abstraction” in particular recalls the classic argument of James C. Scott (1998) that the modern state has always sought to increase society’s “legibility,” to arrange the population in ways that make it more transparent and tractable. Similarly, Severin Fowles argues that archaeologists are prone to transform people into “interchangeable person-units,” in part “by producing maps that present the remains of each time period in isolation from the others” (2016, 195).

Indeed, like the nineteenth-century planners who relished the “beauty, order, and convenience” of a grid, (bio)archaeologists are familiar with the aesthetic impulse to delineate bodies and arrange them in systematic ways. Not unlike other techniques of the state—maps, censuses, vital records—counting and categorizing the dead allow us to manage an unruly mass of strangers in the interest of legibility. Yet by releasing just a few of these individuals from statistical anonymity, we are able to navigate new terrains and times previously delineated as separate or elsewhere. Moreover, by following lifetimes rather than simply constructing “cohorts,” we might move with people out of places or structures that contained their mortal remains and beyond the historical era to which they have been assigned.

Such an approach has important implications for the study of human remains, which involves “making time” with other people’s bodies. The African Burial Ground, for example, is characterized as a colonial cemetery that terminates well before the Spring Street burial vaults were constructed. While the ABG has come to represent the biocultural experiences of eighteenth-century slaves in New York (e.g., Barrett and Blakey 2011), Spring Street could be seen to embody the nineteenth-century ills of urbanization.
Typically, “collections” such as these come to stand for different kinds of people in type or time (e.g., Larsen 2015; Steckel and Rose 2002), often resulting in a kind of hierarchy of suffering. While statistical practices may bring these groups into relation with one another (Mair et al. 2016), the people in them are left materially and historically “out of touch.” As the case of Spring Street demonstrates, these boundaries can be quite dubious, obscuring some interactions while failing to recognize other salient gaps.

Indeed, the paradox of Spring Street is the way a community was maintained in a place increasingly riddled with division and conflict. Ironically, the very techniques of the state that produced abstractions and anonymity are also used at the local level to reanimate personal relations. This “re-embedding,” as Vernon calls it, includes “the rediscovery of the local parish as the essential unit of government,” and “charismatic leaders” who thrive in “bureaucratic political organizations” (2014, 15). Material infrastructure, especially print culture, was central to this process. Along with petitions and slave narratives, antislavery societies such as the one at Spring Street distributed “cards, poems, broadsides, and wafers with popular abolitionist sayings. Few of their opponents could match the sheer volume of abolitionist handicrafts, art, and literature” (Sinha 2016, 253). Thus, these materials of abstraction served not only to rally local relations but also extended action and alliances to faraway places and times.

In this light, the churchgoers at Spring Street—young and old, living and dead—undoubtedly constituted a community, united in a profound social and moral sense. The very layout of the church, however, with people gathering in pews above and in vaults below, tends to disguise the proliferation of difference, the non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous. Yet this gathering of difference allowed new identities to emerge and utopian futures to be imagined. By normalizing the “being together of strangers,” the congregation put into practice what Iris Marion Young saw as the modern ideal of city life: “In the city persons and groups interact within spaces and institutions they all experience themselves as belonging to, but without those interactions dissolving into unity or commonness” (1990, 237). The Spring Street Church appears to be an early example of such an ideal urban space and institution.

Thus, in looking back on such a place, we must be open to the possibility that an apparent lack of “unity” or “commonness” is, in fact, the pattern revealed by our inquiry. This is a decidedly uncomfortable position, of course, for those tasked with making sense of complex phenomena. We move our scales up and down, inside and out, until a “gathering” is found and a difference is defined. There is nothing wrong with this as a mode of exploration as long as the movement continues and the abstract is not mistaken for the concrete (Latour 2010; Rodseth 2015). We must always bear in mind, as Fowles points out, “not just the scale and organization of the population but also the varied histories that would have hung about flesh-and-blood individuals as they struggled to get on together” (2016, 195). Of course “getting on” would have meant different things at different times, as bodies changed, and were changed by, the worlds they encountered. History, in this light, would not have simply hung about them but would have permeated to the bone. Yet bone by itself is not enough to comprehend varied histories. Instead, we must slow down our science, taking time to wander among wider ecologies of data, material remains, and disciplinary practices.13

NOTES

1. More than two decades after the publication of the landmark article by Wood et al. (1992), the osteological paradox is often referred to but “infrequently engaged in a meaningful way” (DeWitte and Stojanowski 2015, 397). At the same time, it has become quite meaningful as a professional mantra, sometimes regardless of its applicability to the case at hand.

2. Conflation of this kind is evident in many studies of human skeletal remains, especially those that group whole societies according to standard demographics, subsistence strategies, social complexity, or other types (e.g., Botha and Steyn 2016; Lambert and Welker 2017; Marklein et al. 2016). Yet even the best accounts of past bodies sometimes resort to characterizations of entire “eras” or “societies” based on conflated categories. Douglas Price et al. (2012), for example, offer a fine-grained analysis of the movements and diets of some 180 individuals excavated from a colonial burial ground in Campeche, Mexico. Yet they go on to collapse all of these into a unified narrative that is explicitly compared to the life history of an individual (2012, 396). Similarly, Roberta Gilchrist (2012) offers a creative and persuasive exposition of life, death, and material practices in medieval England. In the end, however, she assigns individuals to culturally determined “phases of life” based on their skeletal ages at death. Thus, even those born in different generations or centuries may be compressed into the same phase (2012, 48–66, 254–56). In the end, more than 5,000 individual life histories...
spread over five centuries are merged into the “composite life” of “later medieval” England.

3. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this wording, which helped clarify my own thinking about the subtle point involved here.

4. The death of the last survivor of World War II, for example, ushers in a new context in which no living person remembers that war on the basis of firsthand experience; only material remains and secondhand sources are available to “tell the story.” For a case study in the fragility of historical memory, especially with the demise of eyewitnesses and other participants in a significant event, see Novak and Rodseth (2006).

5. The events surrounding the controversial excavation of the African Burial Ground in the 1990s would haunt reactions to the Spring Street site in 2006 and beyond. For example, the ABG would be a point of reference for community organizers protesting the construction of Trump SoHo, for firms and specialists involved in excavation and analysis of the site, and for the First Presbyterian Church of New York City, which served as the institutional “next of kin” to those interred at Spring Street. Past events at the ABG would, therefore, structure and mediate emotions and practices at Spring Street in quite interesting and variable ways. An exploration of the archaeology of the contemporary, including the sociopolitical implications of these two projects, is an interesting topic for future research.

6. This is not to say that these beliefs were wholly unified or static, and there was at least one dramatic shift in the church’s position on slavery. Prior to 1831, the leadership of the church supported the “Colonization” movement, which advocated the return of free black Americans to Africa, and derived its momentum from the slaveholding South. After this date, the church leaders broke with Colonization and turned their support to “Immediatism,” the immediate emancipation of all slaves (Moment 1887).

7. This estimate is a minimum number of individuals (MNI), based on a count of the number of left femurs in the vaults. As such, it vastly underrepresents the number of individuals interred there. Archival research has identified at least 600 entries in the New York City vital records for individuals buried at the Spring Street Presbyterian Church. It remains unclear at this point whether any of these bodies were removed and buried elsewhere after the vaults closed, not an uncommon practice at the time. It is likely that we are also confronted with the problem of decay and diagenesis, especially for the more fragile infant and juvenile remains.

8. Ware’s connection may have extended to a shared interest in the American Colonization Society. His wife and her sisters were active in the movement (Gifford 1975, 10–11), as were pastors of the Spring Street Church at the time of Ware’s death.

9. It is important to note that Mannheim does not imply that these first encounters are in any way “pure” or unrelated to other social positions that set the stage for how they are experienced or how they might inform future acts (cf. Hamilakis 2013, 118–19).

10. It should be pointed out that there have been two interesting attempts to disaggregate bodies in mortuary contexts and develop generational chronologies (Bayliss, Whittle, and Wysocki 2007; Sayer 2010). My approach resonates with Sayer, in particular, in that he focuses on “life-time” rather than “end-of-life” chronologies. At the same time, these studies remain focused on the context of the grave rather than moving out into the world.

11. Many other individuals might have been selected to illustrate the heterogeneity at the site and in the relational properties of life course, landscape, time, and the body. The asynchrony of their lives is evident even in infants and juveniles, whose lifespans correspond to the active dates of the church vaults. Stable isotope analysis indicates that some were weaned quite early in life, while others continued to nurse much later. Such intimate activities would position them differently in relation to other bodies and material substances, and would create disparate routines and ruptures in everyday life.

12. According to Sydney Mintz (1996, 2010), parts of the Caribbean were already “modern” in Vernon’s sense as early as the sixteenth century, when slaveholders forced “people from scores, possibly even hundreds, of different cultures and languages . . . to craft for themselves new ways of life under terrible circumstances” (2010, 10–11). Similarly, Severin Fowles (2016) has recently argued that cosmopolitan centers of the kind Vernon describes existed among non-Europeans in much earlier times. In some pre-Columbian pueblos, for example, there were “congeries of peoples, each with a different history of migrations, each marked by a distinctive accumulation of historical memories” (193), who nonetheless managed to build a life together—not unlike the more recent residents of New York City.

13. Jerimy Cunningham and Scott MacEachern (2016) have advocated “slow science” as a counter to the large-scale, “big-data” studies that depend on, and in turn support, the corporatization of the academy. They call for more “engaged, critical, humane academic work” that involves long-term commitments to research sites, collaborators, and local communities (6). Ultimately, a slower science would provide the time we need to contemplate, explore, and hone our craft.

REFERENCES CITED


